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Abstract
The present study combines human capital theory with work on IPOs related to sources of financial capital of 
recent, publicly traded biopharmaceutical firms and relates this to the de-listing of these firms. The study follows 
the generally accepted view that more or better quality human capital is a positive factor in individual and firm 
performance to develop the hypotheses, positing a negative relationship between these factors and IPO de-listing. 
The results show that to a limited extent firms having CEOs with more or better human capital and strategic 
alliance partners are associated with biopharmaceutical IPOs’de-listing. The study further finds that de-listing in 
this industry is due primarily to acquisitions (and not financial distress) and that the findings differ based upon 
whether examining financial distress or acquisition de-listings. The study draws upon the IPO motivation literature 
to help explain the results.
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Initial public offeringsThe present study combines human capital theory with work on IPOs related to sources of financial capital
of recent, publicly traded biopharmaceutical firms and relates this to the de-listing of these firms. The
study follows the generally accepted view that more or better quality human capital is a positive factor
in individual and firm performance to develop the hypotheses, positing a negative relationship between
these factors and IPO de-listing. The results show that to a limited extent firms having CEOs with more
or better human capital and strategic alliance partners are associated with biopharmaceutical IPOs’ de-
listing. The study further finds that de-listing in this industry is due primarily to acquisitions (and not fi-
nancial distress) and that the findings differ based upon whether examining financial distress or acquisi-
tion de-listings. The study draws upon the IPO motivation literature to help explain the results.Strategic alliances© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The management and financing of nascent firms are two of the
most fundamental issues in enterprise research. For biopharmaceu-
tical firms, the financing issue increasingly has been addressed by
way of an initial public offering (IPO). The IPO represents an “ex-
traordinary, transitory event” in the lives of many firms (Mak &
Roush, 2000: 157). Research on IPOs has focused primarily on
their financial and operational performance both before and after
the IPO (Kooli & Meknassi, 2007). Few studies have analyzed the
de-listing of IPOs after the offering (Fischer & Pollock, 2004), with
most examining financial and market conditions’ effect on firm de-
listing (e.g. Baker & Kennedy, 2002; Sanger & Peterson, 1990).
Combining a human capital perspective with the IPO literature,
the present study examines pre-IPO human and financial capitals’ ef-
fect on firm de-listing after the IPO. Specifically, the study's interest is
in knowing if chief executive officer (CEO) attributes and sources of
capital are associated with recent biopharmaceutical IPOs’ de-listing
from the public markets. The study examines biopharmaceutical
firms as they rely heavily on the talents of their managers (Baum &
Silverman, 2004), are hyper-competitive (Oliver & Lieeskind, 1997),
have considerable capital requirements (DiMasi & Grabowski, 2007;
Xu, 2009), few financial resources of their own (McCutchen &
Swamidass, 1996), long gestation periods for their marketable prod-
ucts (Williams & Pouder, 2010), and are strategically committed to
one single industry (Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer, 1996).ments and suggestions.
rights reserved.The study chooses CEOs to examine as they are widely considered
to occupy a position of unique and powerful influence on the firm
(Daily & Johnson, 1997).
Human capital theory (HCT) suggests that firms with individuals
with more or superior quality human capital achieve higher perfor-
mance in accomplishing pertinent tasks (Wincent, Anokhin, &
Örtqvist, 2010), which in turn should lead to a positive outcome for
the firm. The study accepts this central tenet of HCT. The study exam-
ines the outcome of the IPOs’ de-listing or non-de-listing status after
three years of going public, as this is an understudied area, and is well
beyond the typical lock-up period for pre-IPO investors to divest their
investment in the firm.
De-listings are a frequent event on all stock exchanges (Fama &
French, 2004). Firms de-list for two major reasons—financial distress
and takeovers (Baker & Kennedy, 2002). Fama and French (2004) find
de-listings between 1980 and 2001 to be primarily attributable to
poor financial performance. Researchers (e.g. Bach & Smith, 2007;
Welbourne & Andrews, 1996) typically associate de-listing with
firm non-survival. This is because a negative financial performance
de-listing typically signals the firm's inevitable financial collapse
(Peristiani, 2003). The limited existing literature on IPO acquisitions
suggests that targets of acquisitions are typically weak under-
performers (Jain & Kini, 1999), with few acquired IPOs spun-off and
re-listed in their original form. This study takes an overall view of a
firm's de-listing as a negative outcome (but does not go as far to
call it non-survival or failure) as it represents the end of a firm's
stock being publicly traded by itself.
The study examines general, industry-specific, and firm-specific
human capital factors associated with the IPO's CEO and relate them
to firm de-listing. It also integrates the IPO literature related to
sources of capital and their effect on IPO de-listing. In addition, the
study tests to see if there are differences related to the variables in
2613D.R. Williams / Journal of Business Research 66 (2013) 2612–2618firms that do not de-list, and firms that de-list due to financial reasons
or takeovers.
2. Theoretical framework and research hypotheses
2.1. Human capital theory
Inherent in the history of management scholarship is the view
that top executives matter. Human capital theory (e.g. Becker, 1964;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Schultz, 1961), specifically, suggests that
a firm's outcomes can be partially predicted by managerial character-
istics. Human capital theory primarily has been linked with three
schools of thought: the behavioral school of decision making, social
capital theory, and the resource based view of the firm. Hambrick
and Mason (1984) joined HCT with the behavioral school of decision
making (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963). Hambrick and Mason (1984)
noted that managerial characteristics could act as indicators of the
broad tendencies or behaviors that a manager brought to an adminis-
trative position. These behaviors are the product of the individual's
experiences, training, and background also known as their cognitive
base. HCT posits that increases in knowledge or skills enhance an
individual's cognitive base or ability, typically leading to better out-
comes for the firm (Davidsson & Honig, 2003).
One particular aspect of an individual's knowledge or cognitive
base that HCT scholars note relates to the supporting relationships
between professionals and other economic actors, otherwise known
as social or relational capital (e.g. Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Pennings,
Lee, & Witteloostuijn, 1996). Social capital can occur at both the indi-
vidual or firm-specific level, but is mainly attributable to individual
actors who provide critical resources (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). Typ-
ically, social capital is associated positively with firm performance.
Scholars also tie HCT to the resource based view (RBV) of the firm
(e.g. Arthurs, Besenitz, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2009; Dimov &
Shepherd, 2005). This linkage maintains that the knowledge and ca-
pabilities of the CEO and other top team members act as resources
that lead to competitive advantage as long as they are rare, valuable,
inimitable, and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). Furthermore, a
CEO's experiences, characteristics, and knowledge may act as dynam-
ic resources, leading to competitive advantage for the firm. This com-
petitive advantage also may lead to the positive outcome of
remaining publicly traded. Firms usually hire employees, including
CEOs, based on their perceived human capital for this very reason,
i.e. the CEO's human capital has transferable economic value for the
firm (Becker, 1962; Lepak & Snell, 2002). Thus, the behavioral school
of decision making, social capital theory, and RBV are used to rein-
force and expand the central tenets of human capital theory—that
is, people matter, and to a certain extent different people affect the
firm and its performance differently based upon the level or charac-
teristics of their cognitive bases.
Individuals can possess general, industry-specific, and firm-
specific knowledge and skills (Becker, 1962). General human capital
relates to an individual's education or life experiences that may en-
hance their overall decision-making ability (Cooper, Gimeno-
Gascon, & Woo, 1994). Industry-specific human capital relates to
the knowledge and capabilities that cannot be completely trans-
ferred to other industries. Whereas, firm-specific human capital rep-
resents a unique set of processes, procedures, and insights that have
limited value outside of the originating firm (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper,
& Woo, 1997).
2.1.1. General human capital
Becker (1964) notes that younger persons typically change jobs
more frequently than older persons do. Hambrick and Mason
(1984) propose that the age of managers was inversely related to
their willingness to take risks, with younger managers being more in-
clined to take risk. Hambrick and Mason (1984) base their proposalon previous research that argues that older executives were less
risk-tolerant due to their: (1) ability to grasp new ideas or integrate
these ideas into the firm, (2) greater commitment to the firm and
the status quo, and (3) desire to seek financial security rather than
pursue new disruptive strategies that might lead to firm failure.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) also associate younger managers with
greater growth and variability in profits. Wiersema and Bantel
(1992) found that firms in the process of strategic change are often
managed by teams whose managers are younger.
The IPO process itself is a transformational change for the organi-
zation with new reporting and operational requirements (Peristiani
& Hong, 2004). The pursuit of too much growth or change on the
part of the firm, however, can lead to financial distress (Miller,
1977). Robbins-Roth (2000) notes that many of the private firms
in the initial wave of biotechnology pursued too aggressive a growth
strategy and suffered financial distress, with venture capital part-
ners having to discipline them. In addition, younger managers may
be more inclined to merger or acquisition than older CEOs believing
that there may be additional opportunities in the established or ac-
quiring firm. Younger CEOs also may believe that they have time
once again to become a CEO elsewhere. Thus, the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a. In the biopharmaceutical industry, older IPO CEOs
will be negatively associated with de-listing.
Education represents explicit knowledge that can be articulated,
codified, and transferred between individuals and firms (Dimov &
Shepherd, 2005). Higher levels of education of an individual can re-
flect greater cognitive knowledge and capability (Wiersema &
Bantel, 1992). Thus, higher levels of education typically are associated
with higher task performance by HCT scholars. Education also can re-
flect commitment, motivation, and discipline (Cooper et al., 1994),
which are essential HCT qualities necessary to running a new venture.
The Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree is consid-
ered the main general professional degree for those wishing to man-
age firms. Erikson (2002: 283) notes that most graduating MBAs have
“inherent business potential,” and that venture capitalists tend to in-
vest in start-ups that have MBAs as part of their managerial talent.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that those with a MBA are not
as risk-prone as self-made executives are, with an MBA's didactic
training more geared toward moderating tendencies for big losses
or mistakes.
Thus, the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b. In the biopharmaceutical industry, IPO CEOs with a
MBA will be negatively associated with de-listing.
Prior business experience also can play a significant role in per-
formance. Experience aids in the assimilation of new knowledge
and new situations (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). Senior management
experience, specifically, may act to cultivate skills for interacting
with diverse stakeholders and supervising disparate functions
(Cooper et al., 1994). Few (if any) management jobs require greater
breadth of experience than that of a CEO. Additionally, CEOs are the
primary employees responsible for firm performance and the
human capital that they bring from their prior CEO experience
may lead to the firm's continued listing on a stock exchange.
Thus, the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1c. In the biopharmaceutical industry, IPO CEOs with
previous CEO experience will be negatively associated with de-listing.
2.1.2. Industry-specific human capital
Cooper et al. (1994) note that industry-specific human capital can
affect the performance of a firm by providing the tacit knowledge of
the key success factors of an industry. Tacit knowledge relates to
“know-how,” which is often non-codified knowledge (Davidsson &
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other firms. One would expect that industry-specific tacit knowledge
would be vital to the success of firms in this industry and at this stage
of the firms’ and industry's life cycles.
The biopharmaceutical industry is under-going rapid change as
the traditional chemical based pharmaceutical technologies are
being replaced by biotechnology (Zucker & Darby, 1997). Biotech-
nology is relatively new and has very specialized technology and
personnel. For example, Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) discover
that the founding of new biopharmaceutical firms depends notably
on the number of “star scientists.” Several other studies find indus-
try experience to be important for firm survival. Bach and Smith
(2007) find CEOs of computer related industries with greater indus-
try experience to be associated with IPO survival. Cooper et al.
(1994) discover that new firms with management teams with little
industry experience have higher failure rates. Pennings et al. (1996)
find Dutch accounting firms with founders with more industry-
specific experience having lower mortality rates.
In addition to founders, most of the personnel working in this in-
dustry are highly trained professionals and require a different set
of skills to manage them than, say, a manufacturing firm. Scholars
(e.g. Drucker, 1952; Quinn, Anderson, & Finkelstein, 1996) studying
the management of professionals suggest that professionals prefer
being managed by individuals with backgrounds similar to their
own, and that the success of the firm can be in some part attribut-
able to being managed by such personnel. Thus, the hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. In the biopharmaceutical industry, IPO CEOs with
greater biopharmaceutical experience will be negatively associated
with de-listing.
Hypothesis 2b. In the biopharmaceutical industry, IPO CEOs with a
doctoral degree in the sciences or medicine will be negatively associ-
ated with de-listing.
2.1.3. Firm-specific human capital
As an individual's time with a firm grows, they typically develop
more firm-specific human capital (Pennings et al., 1996). An implica-
tion of this is that employees whose human capital is firm-specific
may become less mobile as they have a limited scope of applicability
(Becker, 1964; Gimeno et al., 1997). Hambrick and Mason (1984)
propose that there is an inverse relationship between years of service
by top managers and their making significant strategic choices about
new environments. Wiersema and Bantel (1992) find a relationship
between length of tenure and commitment to the status quo.
Mobility may be an issue for some managers, this study also takes
the position that length of tenure relates to commitment to the firm
and can mean a belief in the firm's success. From this perspective,
CEO length of tenure can also represent a CEO's belief in his own
human capital and as Becker (1964: 9) states “[m]any workers in-
crease their productivity by learning new skills and perfecting old
ones while on the job.” Also, longer-tenured CEOs may display greater
commitment to the status quo because they had a greater role in de-
veloping it than did shorter-tenured CEOs. The human capital trait of
tenure also suggests certain knowledge about what works within the
firm, and can signal the perseverance necessary to remain publicly
traded. Thus, the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a. In the biopharmaceutical industry, IPO CEOs with
longer tenures will be negatively associated with de-listing.
Many studies (e.g. Arthurs et al., 2009; Cooper et al., 1994) note
that new ventures often come from the insight of individuals working
within an industry who identifies a new opportunity. The biotechnol-
ogy industry is replete with such scientist-founder entrepreneurs.
Founders not only have the greatest knowledge of the firm's operat-
ing history, but also know the pre-history of the firm. Initially, muchof the human capital of the firm derives from the founder. As
Cooper et al. (1994: 375) observes about founder-entrepreneurs,
“[h]e or she is most often solely responsible for the process that
gives meaning to data, identifies the range of alternatives, deter-
mines actions, and carries these out.” Because of this, founders of
firms should have greater firm-specific human capital and both
emotional and financial commitment in excess of a CEO who is
hired after the firm's founding. Fischer and Pollock (2004) note
that founder-CEOs may have more ability than non-founder-CEOs
have in reducing internal conflicts and battles during and after
the IPO. Thus, the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b. In the biopharmaceutical industry, IPO CEOs who had
been founders of the firm will be negatively associated with de-listing.2.2. Financial capital sources
Cooper et al. (1994: 375) note, “the availability of financial capital
can affect the performance of the venture by creating a buffer against
random shocks and by allowing the pursuit of more capital-intense
strategies, which are better protected from imitation.” Biopharma-
ceutical firms are highly capital-intense firms and spend a greater
percentage of their revenue on research and development (R&D)
than any other industry (Danzon, Nicholson, & Pereira, 2005). New
biopharmaceutical firms, however, typically lack internally generated
revenue and rely on outside sources of capital to fund their R&D
efforts (McCutchen & Swamidass, 1996). This study suggests that
financial capital can be similar to human capital from the perspective
that firms with access to greater or higher quality financial capital
should achieve higher performance in accomplishing relevant tasks
and lead to firm non-de-listing.
Biopharmaceutical firms typically receive funding from several
sources (Williams & Pouder, 2010). These funding sources include
founders, banks, angel investors, venture capitalists, other biopharma-
ceutical firms, and the public markets. Prominent among these sources
of funding are venture capitalists and other biopharmaceutical firms.
Venture capitalists have well developed selection methods for
choosing promising new firms for investment (Kollmann & Kuckertz,
2010). Venture capitalists also offer management expertise (Jain,
2001) and help establish social ties with other stakeholders including
other financiers. In this sense, venture capitalists may represent a
form of human capital for the new firm and a higher quality of investor
comparedwith inactive investors. Venture capitalists typically generate
a high internal rate of return. This return typically is generated by way
of an IPO or pre-IPO acquisition. Venture capitalists, however, also typ-
ically retain interest in the firm post IPO (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, &
Vetsuypens, 1990). For these reasons, the presence of venture capital
typically is portrayed as adding value to the firm (e.g. Baum &
Silverman, 2004; Chen, 2009). Thus, the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4a. IPOs with venture capital investors will be negatively
associated with de-listing.
Other biopharmaceutical firms invest in new biopharmaceutical
firms as well. Lerner and Merges (1998) find that pharmaceutical
firms are the single largest provider of funds for new biopharma-
ceutical firms. These established firms invest in new firms either by
acquiring their stock or byway of strategic alliances. Established phar-
maceutical firms do this in order to gain access to the capabilities,
knowledge, and patents of biotechnology firms (Danzon, Epstein, &
Nicholson, 2007). Nicholson, Danzon, and McCullough (2005) find
that in 1998 biotechnology firms received from strategic alliances
with pharmaceutical firms more than three times the amount they
collected in the private and public equity markets combined.
The presence of other biopharmaceutical firms in the form of
owners or strategic alliance partners could represent either a threat
Table 2
Human capital related to de-listing or non-delisting.
Coefficient estimate S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B)
Assets .14 .20 .48 .49 1.15
Patents − .34 .29 1.44 .23 .71
CEO age .11 .05 6.02 .01 1.12
MBA − .64 .65 .97 .33 .53
Previous CEO 1.50 .73 4.28 .04 4.50
Bio experience −1.06 .49 4.65 .03 .35
Ph.D./M.D. .04 .56 .01 .94 1.04
CEO tenure .17 .09 3.28 .07 1.18
Founder 1.45 .54 7.24 .01 4.28
Venture capital − .69 .60 1.34 .25 .50
Alliance partner 1.06 .52 4.24 .04 2.90
Biopharmaceutical − .76 .45 2.89 .09 .47
N=153; Nagelkerke R2=.23.
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firm investors are the entities most likely to acquire another bio-
pharmaceutical firm. For example, biotechnology firms are increas-
ingly opting to be acquired rather than pursue an IPO (Hamilton,
2006). Alternatively, biopharmaceutical firms provide needed capi-
tal in excess of venture capitalists or others' funds. Biopharmaceuti-
cal firms also provide additional industry-specific human capital in
the form of knowledge about managing in this complex environ-
ment and progressing through the arduous regulatory process. Like
venture capital, funds from other biopharmaceutical firms may rep-
resent the dimension of quality funds (i.e., active investment). It
also seems unlikely, and expensive, for an owner to dilute their
ownership interest in a firm in one year (i.e., by way of an IPO)
and then turn around and buy back that interest and others’ interest
a few short years later. Thus, the hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4b. IPOs with biopharmaceutical firm strategic alliance
partners will be negatively associated with de-listing.
Hypothesis 4c. IPOs with other biopharmaceutical firm investors will
be negatively associated with de-listing.
3. Research design and measures
3.1. Sample
The sample includes biopharmaceutical drug firms with standard
industrial classification (SIC) codes 2834 (Pharmaceutical Prepara-
tions) and 2836 (Biological Products). The sample represents bio-
pharmaceutical firms that went public for the first time between
January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2007. One hundred fifty seven
(157) biopharmaceutical firms went public during this period of
which the study uses 153 firms. The author checked each firm's Secu-
rity & Exchange Commission's (SEC) filings, yahoo.finance.com, and
the appropriate stock exchanges’ (e.g. NASDAQ) websites to verify
the date the firm's stock traded for the first time and its status of trad-
ing or de-listing. The study follows the firm's status through Decem-
ber 31, 2010, with 1996 being the first year that these data are
available via the SEC's website.
3.2. Measures
Data come from the firm's filing with the SEC. The dependent
variable indicates if the firm de-lists or ends trading in a major
stock market exchange within three years of its initial public offer-
ing or not. The study controls for the firm's total assets and number
of U.S. patents under the control of the firm. The independent vari-
ables acting as proxies for human capital include: CEO who is a
founder, CEO's age, CEO's tenure, number of years the CEO hasTable 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (
(1) 3-Year delisting .25 .43 –
(2) Assets (ln) 16.85 1.19 .05
(3) Patents (ln) 2.48 .76 − .04 .15
(4) CEO age 49.14 5.94 .09 − .09 .04
(5) MBA .26 .44 .07 − .08 .02 − .14
(6) Previous CEO .17 .38 − .14 − .15 − .05 .09
(7) Ph.D./M.D. .58 .50 − .06 − .08 .12 .03 −
(8) Bio experience (ln) 2.52 .55 − .06 .06 .07 .56** −
(9) Founder .42 .50 − .19* .00 − .06 − .07 −
(10) CEO tenure 3.95 2.68 .01 .13 .11 .08 −
(11) Venture capital .79 .41 .11 .14 .08 − .04
(12) Biopharmaceutical .41 .49 .10 .10 .18* .02 −
(13) Alliance partner .73 .45 − .05 .08 .18* .10
N=153. *significant at the .05 level; **significant at the .01 level.worked in the biopharmaceutical sector (non-academic), CEO's previ-
ous experience as a CEO at another firm, and two variables for CEO's
education—MBA and doctoral degree in a scientific field (Ph.D. or
M.D.). The independent variables for financial capital include venture
capital ownership interest, biopharmaceutical ownership interest, and
strategic alliance participation. The study determines venture capital
investment by cross-matching principal stockholding firms and indi-
viduals with Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital Sources (1996–2004
eds.). The study uses a logistic regression analysis.4. Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations be-
tween variables in the models. Thirty eight of the 153 firms (or
24.8%) de-list within three years of their IPO.
Table 2 presents the logistic regression analysis results. The results
indicate a good fit of the model to the data (Model χ2=25.95
(p.=.01); −2 Log likelihood=145.57; Cox & Snell R2=.16;
R2L=.15; and Nagelkerke R2=.23). The prediction table also appears
to indicate good accuracy of prediction (77.1% correctly predicted).
Table 2 shows that the human capital variables of CEO age, CEO
with previous CEO experience, number of years of biopharma-
ceutical experience by the CEO, and CEO as founder have a statisti-
cally significant correlation with firm de-listing. The direction of
the relationship between de-listing and number of years of previous
biopharmaceutical experience is as predicted. This supports the
hypothesis (e.g. Hypothesis 2a) related to firms with CEOs with
greater biopharmaceutical experience being less likely to de-list.
The odds ratio shows that every one year increase in biopharmaceu-
tical experience decreases the likelihood of de-listing by 65%.
Although several other of the human capital variables are5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
.17*
.60** − .14
.05 .03 − .11
.27** − .07 .18* − .14
.24* − .12 .11 .13 .36**
.12 − .11 − .08 .03 − .18* − .10
.08 − .03 .07 − .04 − .07 − .08 − .13
.03 − .15 .03 .11 − .18 .07 .12 .19* –
Table 3
Human capital over time.
Coefficient estimate S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B)
Assets .15 .13 1.24 .27 1.16
Patents .27 .29 .87 .35 1.31
CEO age .09 .04 6.57 .01 1.09
MBA − .67 .49 1.84 .18 .51
Previous CEO .62 .46 1.80 .18 1.85
Bio experience − .90 .45 4.08 .04 .41
Ph.D./M.D. − .48 .41 1.39 .24 .62
CEO tenure .07 .06 1.22 .27 1.07
Founder 1.06 .43 6.09 .01 2.89
Venture capital .18 .40 .19 .66 1.19
Alliance partner 1.59 .49 10.49 .00 4.92
Biopharmaceutical .09 .35 .06 .80 1.09
N=153.
2616 D.R. Williams / Journal of Business Research 66 (2013) 2612–2618statistically significant, the direction of three of these variables (e.g.
CEO age, previous CEO, and CEO as founder) is not as hypothesized;
and thus, is contrary to the hypotheses (e.g. Hypothesis 1a;
Hypothesis 1c; Hypothesis 3b). Interestingly, a one unit increase in ei-
ther being a previous CEO or founder increases the odds of de-listing
by a factor of 4.50 and 4.28, respectively. The other human capital
variables are not statistically significant, and thus do not support
the hypotheses (e.g. Hypothesis 1b; Hypothesis 2b; Hypothesis 3a).
Of the financial capital sources variables, only the variable of
having an alliance partner is statistically significant. The direction of
the variable, however, is contrary to the hypothesis (e.g. Hypothesis
4b) and increases the odds of being de-listed by a factor of 2.90.
Given the results from the logistic regression model related to
de-listing, it is useful to study the influence of the variables over
time and know the reason for the de-listing. A survivor analysis
using the Cox regression model helps in this manner. In this phase
of the study, the study relaxes the previous requirement of surviv-
ing three years or less and examines all 153 IPOs over time, noting
if they remain listed or when they terminated their trading. Fifty
of the 153 firms (32.7%) de-list at some time over the study period.
Table 3 presents the results from the Cox regression model. Four
indicators are statistically significant—CEO's age, CEO biopharmaceu-
tical experience, founder, and having an alliance partner. Similar to
the logistic regression results, only CEOs with more biopharmaceuti-
cal experience supports one of the hypotheses (Hypothesis 2a). Thus,
the results from the Cox regression model, in general, point to the
same conclusions as the logistic regression model.
Additionally, of the 38 firms that de-list within 3 years, 63.2% (24
firms) de-list due to takeovers, with the remaining 36.8% (14 firms)
de-listing due to financial reasons. The cause of de-listing is deter-
mined by visiting the SEC website and tracking down theTable 4




Log (PNDL/TO) Log (PNDL/FD)
B Wald p-value Exp(B) B
Assets .10 .16 .69 1.11 − .14
Patents − .38 1.26 .26 .68 − .18
CEO age .04 .66 .42 1.04 .13
MBA .06 .01 .94 1.06 −1.54
Previous CEO 1.30 2.42 .12 3.67 1.71
Bio experience − .21 .13 .72 .81 −1.97
Ph.D./M.D. .05 .01 .94 1.05 .09
CEO tenure .11 .94 .33 1.12 .27
Founder 1.9 8.45 .00 7.28 .93
Venture capital − .75 .10 .32 .47 − .66
Alliance partner 1.03 3.02 .08 2.80 .55
Biopharmaceutical − .58 1.22 .27 .56 −1.40
N=153; Nagelkerke R2=.28; NDL = Non-De-listing; TO = Takeover De-listing; FD = Finappropriate form or information for both the acquired firm and
the acquiring firm. The finding related to cause of de-listing is oppo-
site the findings of much of the research on de-listings. Due to this,
it is useful to see if there are differences between firms surviving
and those that de-list due to takeovers or financial distress. The
study uses a multinomial logistic regression to assist in this analysis.
Table 4 presents the results.
The results indicate a good fit of the model to the data (Model
χ2=36.97 (p.=.04); −2 Log likelihood=184.57; Cox & Snell
R2=.22; R2L=.17; and Nagelkerke R2=.28). The first panel (e.g.
Log (PNDL/TO)) shows that the only variable with a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between non-de-listing and takeovers is CEOs
who are also founders. In other words, IPOs with CEOs as founders
are more likely than IPOs without CEO founders to be taken over
or acquired compared with firms that did not de-list. The odds
ratio shows that a firm with a founder is more likely to be acquired
by a factor of over 7.
The second panel (e.g. Log (PNDL/FD)) shows three variables with
statistically significant results: CEOs with biopharmaceutical experi-
ence, CEO tenure, and biopharmaceutical investors. There is a nega-
tive relationship for both CEO biopharmaceutical experience and
biopharmaceutical investors. This means that IPOs with CEOs with
greater biopharmaceutical experience are less likely than IPOs with
CEOs with less biopharmaceutical experience to de-list due to finan-
cial distress compared with firms that did not de-list. Similarly, IPOs
with biopharmaceutical investors are less likely than IPOs without
biopharmaceutical experience to de-list due to financial distress
compared with firms that did not de-list. The reverse is true for
IPOs with CEOs with greater tenure, as IPOs with CEOs with greater
tenure are more likely than IPOs with CEOs with less tenure to de-
list for financial reasons than IPOs that do not de-list.
The third panel (e.g. Log (PTO/FD)) shows that the variable of
CEOs with greater biopharmaceutical experience to be statistically
significant and this relationship is negative. This means that IPOs
with CEOs with greater biopharmaceutical experience are less likely
than IPOs with CEOs with less biopharmaceutical experience to de-
list due to financial distress compared with firms that de-listed
due to takeover.5. Discussion
5.1. Discussion of findings
Human capital theory generally posits that more or better quality
human capital leads to greater performance, which the study argues
should lead to firm non-de-listing. The study's results did not affirmLog (PTO/FD)
Wald p-value Exp(B) B Wald p-value Exp(B)
.22 .64 .87 − .24 .46 .50 .79
.19 .67 .83 .20 .16 .69 1.22
3.49 .06 1.14 .09 1.24 .27 1.10
2.57 .11 .22 −1.60 2.10 .15 .20
2.01 .16 5.52 .41 .08 .77 1.50
6.75 .01 .14 −1.75 4.19 .04 .17
.01 .92 1.10 .04 .00 .97 1.05
3.90 .05 1.31 .16 .86 .35 1.17
1.25 .26 2.54 −1.05 1.10 .30 .35
.48 .49 .52 .09 .01 .94 1.09
.45 .50 1.74 − .48 .27 .60 .62
3.10 .05 .25 − .82 1.05 .31 .44
ancial Distress De-listing.
Table 5











CEO age (Hypothesis 1a) − − n.s. n.s. n.s.
MBA (Hypothesis 1b) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Previous CEO (Hypothesis 1c) − n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Bio experience (Hypothesis 2a) + + n.s. + +
Ph.D./M.D. (Hypothesis 2b) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
CEO tenure (Hypothesis 3a) n.s. n.s. n.s. − n.s.
Founder (Hypothesis 3b) − − − n.s. n.s.
Venture capital (Hypothesis 4a) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Alliance partner (Hypothesis 4b) − − n.s. n.s. n.s.
Biopharmaceutical (Hypothesis 4c) n.s. n.s. n.s. + n.s.
+ means statistically significant as hypothesized; − means statistically significant but not as hypothesized; n.s. means not statistically significant.
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our findings for all analyses.
Following much of the IPO literature, the study takes the view
that financial distress or takeover represents the same outcome—
de-listing. The study finds somewhat different results when it exam-
ines these causes individually. To help with the interpretation of
these results, the study combines the literature on motivations for
firms (and hence CEOs) for undertaking an IPO with the human cap-
ital literature and examines the results from all three statistical
methods simultaneously.
Much of the finance literature on IPOs takes the view that the
IPO is part of the natural progression in the firm's life cycle
(Zingales, 1995). However, as Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998:
28) note “going public is not a stage that all companies reach, but
is a choice.” Some of the non-mutually exclusive reasons (Jain &
Kini, 1999) for going public include raising capital for diversification,
increasing shareholder liquidity, exploitation of the mis-pricing
issue, establishment of fair market value for the firm, and facilitation
of future mergers and acquisitions (Kim & Weisbach, 2008; Pagano
et al., 1998).
One speculation with respect to takeovers compared to non-de-
listed firms is that founder-CEOs may realize that the IPO represents
a way to establish fair market value that is greater than they could
negotiate on their own. The merger and acquisition literature sug-
gests that firms often struggle with establishing a price for the tar-
get firm (Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & Noorderhaven, 2002). The IPO
may represent a means for the pre-IPO owners to establish fair
market value in order for others to acquire their interests, with
the takeover facilitating not only an acquisition but also an exit ve-
hicle for the founder-CEO. In this case, the IPO may represent an exit
mechanism for the founder-CEO similar to that for the venture
capital firms. This exit of the founder-CEO may be due to CEO burn-
out, exhaustion, boredom, or other opportunities, with founders,
perhaps, finding that the transition from entrepreneur to profes-
sional manager of a publicly traded firm a difficult one.
Another speculation is that the founder-CEO may represent a
serial entrepreneur who is more likely to take a firm public and
then seek to hand over the management of the firm to another.
The IPO itself does not facilitate someone else managing the firm;
however, an acquisition may. Haleblian, Devers, McNamara,
Carpenter, and Davison (2009) note that top team turnover is com-
mon in firms that are acquired. The significant finding of CEO tenure
with respect to financial distress de-listing may suggest that the
CEO was “hanging on” or too committed to the status quo as
opposed to seeking to exit the firm, which would be the opposite
motivation of a serial entrepreneur or (perhaps) founder-CEO who
is trying to establish fair market value with the IPO.
Furthermore, regardless of method, the results show that CEOs with
greater biopharmaceutical experience are negatively related to de-
listings (especially due to financial distress). This suggests that to a cer-
tain extent industry experience matters for biopharmaceutical CEOs.This is the case no matter if we compare financial distress de-listings
to non-de-listings or takeovers. Likewise, having biopharmaceutical in-
vestors lessens the likelihood of a financial distress de-listing compared
to non-de-listing. Taken together, this suggests that industry experience
and (perhaps social human capital) connections matter with respect to
not having a financial distress de-listing.
5.2. Limitations
The present study has several limitations. The study examines only
biopharmaceutical firms, and it is not known if the findings are general-
izable to other firms in other industries. The sample size is modest and
represents a relatively short period of time. The study also focuses on
the influence of a single individual as opposed to those of the top man-
agement team or governing body. It also looks at the CEO's attributes
prior to the IPO, not considering changes in attributes or persons post
IPO.
6. Conclusions
The study finds several indicators that suggest that CEOs with
more or better quality human capital are associated with IPOs’ de-
listings. It also finds that the majority of firms in the study de-list
due to acquisitions, not financial distress. The study speculates that
the motivations of CEOs may somewhat account for the findings.
The findings should be of interest to scholars, practitioners, and inves-
tors as they suggest that biopharmaceutical firms with founder-CEOs
are associated with a greater likelihood of the firm being acquired
after the IPO, as well as firms with CEOs with greater biopharmaceu-
tical experience or biopharmaceutical investors being less likely to
suffer a financial distress de-listing.
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